In this material, star graph and double star graph, as shown in Figure 1 , which are usually seen as simplifications of scale-free social networks, 1, 2 are employed to examine the evolutionary dynamics in the evolutionary dictator game. For the simplicity of explanation, let us simply review the proposed framework of evolutionary dictator game. In the evolutionary dictator game, the population is located on a static network. An individual, represented as a node, plays dictator games with its directly linked neighbors. In each link, the game is played only once. In the dictator game, there are a dictator who completely determines how to split a sum of money and a responder who passively receives the remainder left by the dictator. The strategy of each player is the quantity offered to its opponent if the individual is in the role of the dictator. In the following of this file, the terms "strategy" and "offer" of an individual are indiscriminate. In order to determine who can act as the dictator, a degree-based regime of roles assignation 3, 4 is adopted. In this roles assignation scheme, a parameter α is used to determine the assignation of roles. Positive α means that individuals with higher degrees are more likely to be the dictators, while negative α corresponds to the inverse side. Apart from roles assignation, the strategic updating mechanism and evaluation function of the players' success also have impact on the evolutionary results. The strategic updating mechanism sets the rule of transformations of player's strategies. The evaluation function of the players' success is used to determine which kind of payoffs, accumulated payoff or average payoff, is adopted in the strategy updating. In this material, we respectively study 4 situations on both star and double star graphs: (1) Fermi dynamics + accumulated payoff; (2) Fermi dynamics + average payoff; (3) Bak-Sneppen dynamics + accumulated payoff; (4) Bak-Sneppen dynamics + average payoff. The results are given as follows.
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In a star graph, there are a hub node and many leaf nodes. Assume the hub is linked with N leaves, N ≫ 1 in a scale-free network. The accumulated payoff of hub is denoted as ψ h , the accumulated payoff of each leaf is denoted as ψ i , i = 1, · · · , N . In the initial, the offer (i.e., strategy) of each individual is generated at random.
When α < 0 (i.e., lower-degree individuals have more opportunities to play the role of dictators), the payoff
the offer of each leaf. The offer of hub is indicated by p h . Due to p i is generated randomly and N is a big integer, it is easy to meet ψ h > ψ i , ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N }. Furthermore, the gap between ψ h and ψ i is considerable.
By adopting Fermi dynamics to strategy updating, the hub will preserve its current strategy which is imitated by leaves at the same time. As a result, the offer of hub spreads over the whole star graph quickly. Figure 2 shows the evolutionary process of offers as a function of generation when α = −4 on a star graph. As can be found from Figure 2 , at the second round the offer of hub has been imitated by leaves. The result shows that only hub's strategy can survive in a star graph when α < 0. In the initial, the offer of each individual is generated at random.
When α > 0 (i.e., higher-degree individuals have more opportunities to play the role of dictators), the payoff of hub is ψ h = N (1 − p h ), the payoff of each leaf is ψ i = p h . Noted that the payoffs of leaves are identical. There are two cases: (i) if ψ h > ψ i , namely p h < N/(N + 1), the hub's offer can spread over the whole star network, the evolutionary process is similar to Figure 2 ; Otherwise (ii) the offer of a randomly selected leaf p i is imitated by the hub. Then a new round begins. At the new round, if the hub's new offer p i meets p i < N/(N + 1), it will spread over the network and the evolution achieves stability. As shown in Figure 3 , in the situation of α = 4, the hub's initial offer p h will spread over the whole network if p h is smaller than a threshold N/(N + 1) (here it is around 0.968), otherwise p h could not be the final offer of whole population. Compared to the situation of α = 4, the hub's initial offer will always become the final offer of population when α = −4, as shown in Figure 3 . Based on the results mentioned above, it is found that in most cases the offer of hub will spread over the whole star graph if adopting Fermi dynamics within the context of accumulated payoff regardless of α < 0 or α > 0.
Evolution on a double star graph
Now let us consider the evolutionary process on a double star graph, as depicted in Figure 4 For the sake of simplification, we assume that the generated p x and p y meet p x < N/(N + 1) and p y < M/(M + 1). Based on the analysis given in section 1.1, the offer of hub will spread over the whole star whether α < 0 or α > 0. Therefore, in the end of stage S1 the left star is composed by individuals with offer p x and the right star consists of individuals with offer p y , as shown in Figure 4 . In the next, the roles assignation determines the evolutionary dynamics of population.
When α < 0, the accumulated payoffs of two hubs, indicated by ψ x and ψ y , is easily obtained that,
For simplification in mathematical expression, the above condition is transformed to a stricter one
This transformation is not with significant impact to the final result. So,
If equation 1 holds, h y 's offer is imitated by h x , so that the left star will be invaded by the right star, shown as case 1 in Figure 4 ; Otherwise, h y imitates h x 's strategy, as a result the right star is invaded by the left star, shown as case 2 in Figure 4 . Equation 1 implies that an individual with high offer has an advantage to reproduce and spread its strategy when α < 0. Especially when h x is a very selfish individual (i.e., p x is very small), the selfish strategy p x is inevitably substituted by a more generous strategy p y . In other words, the altruism of population is promoted when lower-degree individuals act as the dictators.
Correspondingly, when α > 0 the analysis process is similar to that mentioned above. The payoffs of two hubs can be obtained
In xN the payoff of each leaf is p x , and in yM the payoff of each leaf is p y . The offer of h y will be imitated by
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which is transformed to a stricter condition
The left star will be invaded by the right star if equation 2 holds, shown as case 1 in Figure 4 ; Otherwise, the left star will invade the right star, shown as case 2 in Figure 4 . Equation 2 indicates that a low offer p y has a potential advantage of spread when α > 0. In other words, the altruism is suppressed to a certain degree when α > 0, compared to the case of α < 0. But such advantage is conditional. If N is much larger than M , the hub h x also can resist the invading of lower offer hub h y , and h y would conversely imitate h x 's strategy. In a real scale-free social network, the individuals with high offer can survive so that the altruism still appears to a certain degree. But it is not as much as effective to promote the altruism of population when higher-degree individuals are in the role of dictators, compared with the setting that lower-degree individuals are more likely to be dictators. The number of leaves N = 40 and M = 39. In the initial, the offer of each individual is generated at random.
In order to examine these analysis, we conduct computer simulations. The results are shown in Figure 5 .
Either α = −4 or α = 4, at the beginning the strategy of hub can spread over the corresponding substar. Then, the roles assignation determines which kind of hubs' initial strategies, maximum or minimum, is imitated by other individuals. When α = −4 (see Figure 5 (a)), the offer of whole population gradually goes close to the maximum initial offer of hubs h x and h y (in the end of evolution, there only exists one strategy shared by each individual, we treat that strategy as the strategy or offer of population). Thus, it is beneficial for the spread of altruism that lower-degree individuals act as the dictators. In contrast, when α = 4 (see Figure 5 (b)), the minimum initial offer of h x and h y will be the final strategy of population, which implies that the strategy of more selfish hub is easy to spread when higher-degree individuals have more opportunities to act as the dictators. In other words, the higher-degree individuals acting as dictators are harmful to the spread of altruism to a certain degree. Generally speaking, the computer simulations conform the theoretical analysis.
2 Adopting Fermi dynamics within the context of average payoff In this section, the evolutionary process is studied on a star or double star graph within the context of average payoff. The analysis process is similar to those mentioned above. In this situation, the transition of strategies is not convenient to describe by using mathematical equations, however, the computer simulation provides a visualized expression to the evolutionary process. 
Evolution on a star graph
Due to the strategies of individuals are generated randomly, the payoff of hub is not higher than all leaves' payoffs in the initial. According to the Fermi dynamics, the hub is likely to imitate the strategy of a randomly selected leaf who has a lower offer, even the hub's strategy is still imitated by some other leaves having higher offers at the same time. As a result, the average offer of leaves reduces, as well as the offer of hub. In a new round, this process is repeated until the offer of hub becomes low enough. When the offer of hub is low enough so that it is robust to resist invasions, hub's selfish strategy will be imitated by all leaves. But due to the inherent stochasticity of the Fermi update rule works effectively within the context of average payoff, the stability of evolution is not easy to achieve. Besides, in the setting that lower-degree individuals is more likely to be dictators, the strategies of most leaves are not easy to disappear, so the extinction rate of strategies is low especially with the use of average payoff. Hence, the evolutionary process is gradual, both the offer of hub and average offer of leaves decrease along with the evolution, as shown in Figure 6 (a). Therefore, it is not effective at promoting altruism on a star graph if adopting Fermi dynamics within the context of average payoff.
Then let us consider the case of α > 0, as shown in Figure 6(b) . When α > 0, the payoffs of the hub and each leaf are ψ * h = 1 − p h and ψ * i = p h , where p h is the offer of hub. The evolutionary process is simple because the payoffs of leaves are invariably identical. If ψ * h > ψ * i namely p h < 0.5, the leaves tends to imitate the strategy of hub, and the hub is inclined to preserve his current strategy. Otherwise, the results are inverse. Such strategic updating mechanism prompts a generous hub becomes a selfish one so that the hub gains the highest payoff.
Once p h < 0.5, the hub tends to hold its current selfish strategy. But due to the inherent stochasticity of the The number of leaves N = 30. In the initial, the offer of each individual is generated randomly.
Fermi update rule, the advantage of individuals with higher payoffs is not determinant, especially in the context of average payoff. Even the hub's current offer is lower than 0.5, it also has opportunity to be substituted by a lower offer from its leaf neighbors. Therefore, the offer of hub shows the tendency of decline in the beginning, as well as the average offer of leaves, as shown in Figure 6(b) . On the other hand, when α > 0 the evolution quickly achieves stability. In the stable state, there is only a strategy in the whole star graph. The rapid convergence is owed to the roles assignation. If higher-degree individuals are likely to be dictators, the payoffs of leaves are determined by the hub. If p h < 0.5, many leaves will immediately abandon their own random strategies in the beginning several rounds. As a result, the number of strategies in the whole network decrease fast. The strategies of individuals could quickly converge to a single strategy, as shown in Figure 6(b) . Overall, it is also not effective at promoting altruism when α > 0.
Based on these given above, a conclusion can be drawn safely that the altruism behavior is not encouraged on a star graph if adopting Fermi dynamics within the context of average payoff.
Evolution on a double star graph
Due to the average payoff is used as the evaluation function of players' success in this situation, in a double star graph the advantage of hub's connectivity disappears. Relative to the other hub, a hub can be simply seen as a leaf node linked with it. The evolutionary process on a double star graph is similar to that on a star graph. When α = −4, as displayed in Figure 7(a) , the offers of hubs h x and h y , as well as the average offers of leaves xN and yM , decline gradually at the beginning. With the increase of generation, the curves are leveling off and they are overlapped basically, which implies the evolution is gradually archiving stability. But due to the stochasticity of Fermi dynamics especially with the use of average payoff and the roles assignment scheme that lower-degree individuals are more likely to act as dictators, the strategies of most leaves are not easy to disappear so that the extinction of strategies in each substar is not very quickly. Especially, if a leaf node's offer is very low, it's payoff (of course, the average payoff) is always higher than that of the corresponding hub so that the leaf node can forever keep its strategy. Therefore, the curves of offer of hub and average offer of corresponding leaves are not overlapped completely. In the double star graph, the totally stability and convergence of strategies can not be archived easily, but there is a potentially declining trend for the offer of population, as shown in Figure   7 (a).
When α = 4 (see Figure 7 (b)), at the beginning, the strategy of each selfish hub is imitated by many its lined leaves so that the average offers of xN and yM drop quickly. But the stochasticity of update rule leads to the survival of a few individuals with random strategies. Also because this stochasticity, each hub is with the possibility to learn more selfish strategy from the surviving random individuals. Subsequently, the more selfish strategy can further decline the offer of population through hubs. In the process, the interaction between two hubs is similar to two simple nodes. The strategy of one hub with higher payoff (i.e., the lower offer), is firstly imitated by the other hub, and further imitated by leaves in the other substar through the imitator hub in the next round. By this means, one substar invades the other substar. Additionally, the roles assignation that higher degree individuals are more likely to be dictators accelerate the extinction of strategies. Therefore, finally there is only one strategy in the whole double star graph, as graphically expressed by the overlap of curves of offers of h x and h y , and average offers of xN and yM , as shown in Figure 7 (b).
In summary, in a double star graph the hubs are fragile to the invading of selfish strategies and would facilitate the spread of selfish behaviors if adopting Fermi dynamics within the context of average payoff.
3 Adopting Bak-Sneppen dynamics within the context of accumulated payoff and average payoff Due to the evolutionary processes are similar within the context of accumulated payoff and average payoff if adopting Bak-Sneppen dynamics, in this section the results of these two situations are given synchronously for the sake of comparison. In the Bak-Sneppen dynamics, the lowest payoff individual and its immediate neighbors will be substituted by new individuals with random strategies. So the key point is to find the poorest individual, which is denoted as L * in the following text.
Evolution on a star graph
Accumulated payoff. Let's firstly consider the context of accumulated payoff. When α = −4 (see Figure   8 (a)), in a star graph the accumulated payoff of hub is ψ h = N i=1 p i , the payoff of each leaf is ψ i = 1 − p i , where p i is the offer of each leaf. In the initial, the strategies of individuals are generated randomly. As shown in Figure   8 (a), the offer of hub presents randomness, whose mean is around 0.5, and the average offer of leaves declines periodically from around 0.5 to 0. The reason is given as follows.
In the beginning, the hub is not to be the lowest accumulated payoff individual because of its advantage of connectivity, so the leaf node who has the highest offer, denoted as Q, will become the poorest one L * . In the stage of strategy updating, leaf Q as the individual who has the lowest payoff, and the hub who is implicated as the unique neighbor of Q, are substituted by individuals with random strategies in strategy updating. If the offer of new Q is not the highest among leaves, the original second poorest individual becomes the poorest one and requires a lower offer. As a result, the average offer of leaves decreases with the rise of generation, and the offer of hub is generated randomly in each round. Along with the evolution goes on, the offer of each leaf becomes lower and lower so that their payoffs are higher and higher. The hub gains less and less from the leaves so that at a special moment the hub will become the poorest individual. Based on the Bak-Sneppen dynamics, at that moment the offers of hub and all leaves will be randomly generated again. The preceding procedure is performed once again. Therefore, as shown in Figure 8(a) , the evolution is periodic.
When α = 4, still within the context of accumulated payoff, the result is shown as Figure 8(b) . In this case, the accumulated payoff of ψ h = N (1 − p h ), and the accumulated payoff of each leaf is p h . The evolutionary process is affected by hub's offer p h . If p h is high, the payoff of hub may be lower than its leaves so that all individuals will be substituted by new generated individuals with random offers. If p h is low, a randomly selected leaf node will be seen as the poorest individual due to each leaf has a same payoff. We can find that the offer of hub is surely updated in every round, and the filtering to the offers of leaves disappears so that the randomness of offers is kept. Therefore, as displayed in Figure 8(b) , the offer of hub and average offer of leaves are fluctuating whose mean values are both 0.5.
Average payoff. Then the context of average payoff is considered. Whether for α = −4 or for α = 4, the evolutionary process is similar to the situation of accumulated payoff. But due to the use of average payoff, there are a little difference. When α = −4 (see Figure 8(c) ), the offer of hub is random, whose mean value is 0.5. But for the average offer of leaves, superficially, it seems its periodicity disappears. But, actually, the periodicity still exists. Just because the length of each period becomes short so that they are closed together in Figure   8 (c). When α = −4 and using the average payoff, the critical condition to generate new random offers for all individuals, ψ * h < ψ * i , ∀i = 1, · · · , N , is easy to meet even the lowest offer among those of leave is a relatively high value. This reason shorten the length of period in the curve of average offer of leaves. When α = 4 (see Figure 8(d) ), the evolutionary dynamics is very similar to that shown in Figure 8 (b). In Figure 8(d) , either for the offer of hub, or for the average offer of leaves, the mean value is 0.5, which is cause by the randomness of offers. Because of the use of average payoff, the hub has more opportunities to becomes the poorest individual so that the simultaneous updating of all individuals is more frequent.
Evolution on a double star graph
The evolutionary process on a double star graph, as shown in Figure 9 , is similar to that evolving on a star graph.
Accumulated payoff. In the context of accumulated payoff, when α = −4 (see Figure 9 (a)), the offers of hubs h x and h y are still random, whose mean values are both 0.5. Sometimes these curves are horizontal, which is due to the the strategy updating takes place in one substar at one time point so that the offers of individuals in the other substar are not changed. In addition, because of the same reason, the period of average offer of xN or yM is separated by the other one. As for α = 4 (see Figure 9 (c)), the result is the overlap of evolutionary trajectories obtained from two star graphs. It also should be noted that the poorest individual either belongs to the left star or belongs to the right star at one time point.
Average payoff. In the context of average payoff, the evolutionary process on a double star graph, as shown in Figure 9 (b) and Figure 9(d) , is also similar to the results obtained from the evolution on a star graph when α = −4 and α = 4, respectively. The analysis has already been given in above section. 
